



Framing the Question and the Approach
Following the lead of the organizing document, with some amendments that
might eventually be explained if time is available, let me distinguish among four different
types of agents:
(1) the individual;
(2) society and groups within the civil society;
(3) the state; and
(4) international agencies, either regional or global.   
In theory, each of these can be threatened or be a source of threat. That threat can
be a perceived one or an actual one. Further, whether perceived or actual, each agency
has its own set of institutional practices that embody norms that justify a type and degree
of response. Each of these agents can respond to the threat, whether perceived or real, at
various different levels. First, the agent can immediately respond to the threat with any
defensive initiatives within its capability and determination. Second, the agent can
communicate that it perceives the threat, the evidence on which that perception is based,
the normative justification for responding to the perceived threat, and/or the response
expected and possibly from whom. Third, the agent can take the perception and the
evidence for it to a judicial authority to adjudicate the threat and authorize an
enforcement action to reduce or eliminate the threat. Finally, the agent can engage in a
moral campaign to publicize existing norms or advocate a shift in the meaning of norms
(and, sometimes, even propose new norms) for dealing with the threat. Alternatively, an
intellectual program can be undertaken (usually by academics) to understand the source
and roots of the campaign so that, once explained, it can be dealt with more adequately.
 For each type of agent we find the same four types of threats:
1) coercive threats to physical well-being and safety;
2) economic threats to material well-being and security;
3) threats to the integrity and autonomy of that agency;
4) threats to the recognition and legitimacy of the boundaries of that agency.
In the cases under study, the concern is with immigrants and the national and
international immigration regimes. To link up immigration with a framework for
examining threats, we also need some intellectual understanding of immigration. There
are four aspects of immigration policy:
(1) overseas or international policy;
(2) entry policy re immigrants;
(3) domestic asylum policies re refugees;
(4) domestic integration policies and practices re both immigrants and refugees.
The interpretation of the refugee regime depends on the intellectual glasses with
which these policies are approached. Realists regard immigration and refugee policies as
ones determined by the power and economic interests of autonomous (and, presumably,
2unitary) rational state actors. Because of that, the security of the state actor (rather than
the security of its individual members or the culture of the society or the integrity of the
nation) is the principle determinant of immigration policy, both domestically and
internationally. Therefore, immigrants are selected in terms of numbers and qualities on
the basis of the degree to which they strengthen the state. Refugees are allowed entry
because it serves the international interests of the state to do so. Overseas policies are
dictated by the same concerns, and vary by state according to the interests of that state.
However, within the state, the determination of those interests and the priority among
them are determined by the economic and social interests of the members of that state.
Neo-liberals add to the realist perspective the role of international agencies and
regimes in fostering immigration and the intake of refugees as well as their settlement
and repatriation into a specific country. Further, states follow, enhance and develop
international institutions and norms to handle and deal with the problems of immigrants
and refugees. The cooperation and coordination among countries, in turn, is aided by the
development of these international institutions and NGOs as an international global civil
society is it itself fostered by the international refugee and immigration regime. In turn,
the degree of cooperation and coordination of any one state in such a developing
immigration and refugee regime is affected by domestic immigration and refugee
coalitions in the civilian society, some with international links. They critique state
policies and foster the development of ones that are more conducive to the development
of greater cooperation and coordination among states.
Thirdly, we find the institutional theorists on the domestic front and the grotians
internationally who examine domestic and international bureaucracies. Rules and laws,
and the policies and practices that enforce them, are the key ingredients in the
development of immigration and refugee policies. Autonomous, and determined more by
their own agendas than the interests of the state or the pressures of social and interest
groups, the changing nature of such bureaucracies are examined to explain shifts in
immigration and refugee law. For it is these groups that see themselves as the universal
protectors of either the interests of the state or the emerging global regime rather than
interests on their own, on the one hand, or the teleological pre-established goal of an
increasingly progressive neo-liberal international regime of cooperation and co-
ordination.
Finally, there are various forms of cosmopolitans and globalization theorists
(globalists) varying from structuralists to neo-Gramscians who argue that the state is
beginning to wither away under the assault of international forces and economics so that
states are increasingly unable to control their own immigration and refugee policies. Most
efforts of state political actors, supporters of international regimes and members of
bureaucracies generally fight various types of rearguard actions to offset the effects of
such forces. In the case of neo-liberals, they as often as not surrender to them in the hopes
that they foster a more egalitarian and cooperative world. Grotian/bureaucratic theorists
believe state rules and laws combined with international ones can be used to tame these
forces even as the sovereignty of states that govern exclusive sections of the territory of
the globe is being undermined by these global economic forces.
Given this intellectual frame for examining the relationship to the relationship
between security and migration policy, I can now turn to the examination of the papers
themselves.
3The Themes and Ideas of the Initiators of the Project
The opening assumption focuses on the expansion of the concept of security from
military threats to the state and its territorial integrity to a broader concept of security that
includes economic, social and environmental issues. Both voluntary and forced migration
have been connected to this wider conception of security. In turn, humanitarian military
actions have been initiated at the UN or by coalitions of the like-minded often to deal
with massive movements of populations and/or massive human suffering that threaten the
stability of the nation-state system.
This is a globalist perspective. Intellectual trends are perceived as following this
globalist trend by broadening the conception of security away from a state-centered
approach, with its concentration on the military threat to the state of realist theory, and
focusing on the intersection of this broader conception of security and migration. Put
another way, security theorists have been realists and migration theorists have tended to
be neo-liberals. As this project is conceived, it is a marriage and overcoming of the
tensions and contradictions between the realist approach to security issues and the neo-
liberal approach to immigration policy in favour of a more transcendental globalist
methodology and global perspective.
What methodology did they plan to follow? First, by taking the broadest
conception of security, they propose to examine the conflicting interpretations of security
scholars (presumably state-centred realists) and migration scholars (presumably neo-
liberals in my terminology). Do they intend to do this by examining in detail the research
of both security and migration scholars to tease out the contradictions and critique and
overcome them? No, though they construct a Readers Digest summary of their
historiography of intellectual development in which neo-liberals of the Copenhagen
School and Critical Security Theorists (themselves globalists) have challenged the
dominant realist paradigm. (Unfortunately, I have neither the time nor the tools with me
to examine the validity of the interpretation offered. Is there a tension in the studies that
link security and migration to focus on the bipolarity of state security and control versus
the human rights of the individual seeking asylum? The late Myron Wiener, Mark Miller
and Astri Suhrke are all seen as precursors to such a study in focusing on this nexus.) The
plan was to examine four regions of the globe and have the conjunction of migration and
security examined both by a scholar with a security orientation and one with a
background in immigration studies. Further, one global issue, human trafficking, was to
be examined from both perspectives.
The selection of this one cross-cutting global issue is never given a rationale.
However, one can speculate on what it might be. After all, human smuggling threatens
the very conception of the realist paradigm that states exist and can function to protect
their own members. If states are unable to fulfill the most fundamental function of the
state, to ensure that its citizens alone through the auspices of the state can determine who
or who cannot be members of that state, then the plausibility of the realist state-centered
paradigm is already threatened. Further, the prime victims of human smuggling are
individuals.  What better theme to take up than one which both encompasses a threat to
the state at a most fundamental level and, at the same time, is a threat to the individual,
the prime focus of the new interest in human security. And one is most threatening to the
individual – that which removes the freedom to move from the individual and makes that
4individual an instrument for a new global cartel focused on making money out of human
exploitation and degradation.
Further, if one examines the two by four matrix and the focus on what is to be
protected, physical security of the individual is subsumed as a value. It is as if one
chooses to protect or risk or be unconcerned with one’s physical security depending on
Maslow, from whom the individual list of items chosen
reduces values to a hierarchy of needs. The concern with safety – an anticipatory measure
to ensure physical security - is accepted as a different value than physical security itself.
It is no surprise that not one of the authors pays virtually any attention to the other three
values – love, worth and self-actualization for I have yet to see either a security or
migration scholar take up any of these “values” as serious components of their analysis.
What is more interesting is that physical security is subsumed as a value as a way of
throwing mud in the eyes of realists and saying, “So There!!!” Fortunately, none of the
scholars, including the three who created the matrix, pay any real attention to this frankly
silly set of sub-categories.
Further, the concept of state-society security is vague and confusing. Is the
reference to the civil society? Or is the reference to the an ethnic or national group within
a state that may feel threatened physically or by migration pressures. For example, in the
case of the latter, empirical studies indicate a wide variety of measures that ethnic groups
and nations take to the possible diminution of their ethnic group or nation if it is
perceived to be under threat. These include anti-emigration measures, population birth
policies, language and cultural policies, efforts to change boundaries of the state to
increase the control of the nation over the instruments of the state, economic policies
(including tax measures, subsidies, and collective strategic investment policies by the
ethnic group perceived as a collectivity), limitations on human rights and, not least of all,
migration policies to counter ethnic dilution and foster ethnic consolidation. At the same
time, measures can be adopted that foster the out migration of other groups through the
creation of a less hospitable environment to such extreme measures as coerced ethnic
cleansing. What the matrix provides is a vaguer and more general category referring to
identity, culture and social cohesion and adding economic, social and environmental
well-being without distinguishing how these differ on the state and international level
versus the ethnic level or the perspective of the civil society as a contrast.
Further, when one looks at the state and international level, the inputs of and
effects of bureaucrats and officers of the state and of international institutions to the
issues of both security and migration and their emphasis on management and control are
virtually ignored. Contrast this to what may be considered the Canadian/Australian
school (reflecting the importance of mandarins in the running of these respective states).
Excluding my own writings, see, for example, the writings of Irv Abella, Gerald Dirks,
Glenn,Freda Hawkins, Alan Simmons (even though he is an ostensible globalist), N.
Suyama, Harold Troper, Reg Whitaker (who, incidentally, has been writing on both
seurity and immigration issues for over twenty years) from Canada, or the writings of
Allan Borowski, Cox, Ian Hardcastle, Holton, Finder, Foster and Parker from Australia.
Does this reflect the general propensity to deny the separate existence of the others most
proximate to oneself?
Without any further ado, let me turn to the papers themselves.
5Migrant Smuggling and Security
Miskel’s title misleads. It is a study of American policy in dealing with migrant
smuggling from a security perspective. Further, it is the study of a neo-liberal political
regime, that of Clinton. As such, instead of political autonomy and internal security, the
values articulated in the organizer’s matrix, the author documents that the goals of a neo-
liberal state regime focus on democracy, including the promotion of democracy overseas.
This supports my contention that the interpretation of the primary values of the state and
the lens through which those values are examined reflect the primary propensity of that
state as well as the angle of vision of the scholar doing the examination. In this case, we
have a neo-liberal policy being examined through the lens of a neo-liberal theorist.
Further, because the neo-liberal position is an international expansion built on
fundamentally realist premises, all four tools available - informational and diplomatic as
well as economic and military - are used for security purposes. Informational and
diplomatic as well as economic tools (but not military ones) are used bolster prosperity.
But only economic and informational tools are used to foster democracy. These positions
are totally consistent with a neo-liberal perspective and regime.
It is not surprising that the analysis begins, not with smuggling, but with
interpretations of threats to state security from mass flows of migrants. Further, the
analysis concludes that the security threat does not come from the outside per se but from
the cross-border connections between indigenous groups and migrants. The fact that this
is empirically questionable is not examined and reinforces the idea that the lens through
which the material is examined has shaped the result. For example, Turkey’s position vis
a vis the Kurdish influx is both described and justified because of the connection to its
internal dissident minority of Kurds. No consideration is given to the arguments that the
Kurdish refugees in being stopped at the border were being denied their refugee rights
under the Convention. More misleadingly, and apparently with little empirical knowledge
of Zaire and what happened in 1994-95, the author contends that “Zaire’s security,
economy and form of government were all jeopardized by the hundreds of thousands
[actually, over a million] of Rwandans who streamed into eastern Zaire during the 19994
Rwandan civil war.”
First, the war had begun in 1990. The refugees were a product of the defeat of the
Hutu extremists coup, the genocide, the RPF new determination to totally defeat the
RPA, and the inducement and coercive measures of the fleeing army that wanted a source
of further recruits as well as a shield (reinforced by the humanitarian agency influx)
against the conquering RPF. To describe these refugees as a product of the war rather
than the coup and the genocide is a vey questionable interpretation of history.  Those who
flowed (or were forced) into Zaire included both refugees and military – approximately
50,000 FAR and probably even more Interahamwe. Initially, rather than threaten
Mobutu’s kleptocratic regime, they quickly became allied with it because they offset the
dissident elements to his regime from within, provided an economic input into the region
through humanitarian aid, and only two years later emerged as the crucial security threat
to the regime.  Finally, the assertion that the Rwanda refugee intervened directly in
support of indigenous Hutu elements inside Zaire suggests that the indigenous Huitu
Banyarwanda were under threat. I believe virtually all scholars claim that it was the
6extremists in the refugee camps who threatened the Tutsi Banyarwanda and instigated the
local Hutu population against their Tutsi Banyarwanda neighbors.
The author makes the same claim with respect to the Kurds – their outflow was
the result of war. If I may quote myself (only because I did not have any other resources
available this morning),
Following the defeat of the Iraqi army and the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait,
uprisings took place in the north and south of Iraq to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime.
Both rebellions were quickly put down and, in the north, the suppression of the rebellion was
accompanied by the harsh repression of the local population. Reinforced by memories of the
use of chemical weapons on civilian populations, panic and a mass exodus took place as up
to two million Kurds fled into the mountains towards the Turkish and Iranian borders.
The Turks, in contrast to the Iranians, would not let the Kurdish refugees in. In
response to formal requests from both Turkey and France, and under its mandate to protect
threats to international peace and security, the United Nations Security Council passed
Resolution 688 by a vote of 10-3 condemning, "the repression of the Iraqi civilian population
in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences
of which threaten international peace and security in the region," and appealed to "all
Member States and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to these humanitarian
relief efforts."
President Bush of the United States had resisted the pressure of President Turgut
Ozal of Turkey and Prime Minister John Major of Britain to become involved. He did not
want to fuel Kurdish separatism, dismember Iraq, set a dangerous precedent for interference
in the internal affairs of a sovereign state or recommit American ground forces on Iraqi soil.
The ineffectiveness of the private relief operations, the refusal of the Turkish authorities to
open its borders to the fleeing refugees, the inaccessibility of the sites in the mountains and
the urgency and massive nature of the problem impelled Bush to act and reintroduce troops
into Iraq to induce the Kurdish refugees to return while the army provided for their relief and
protection.
Resolution 688 was interpreted by Britain, France and the United States as
permitting, if not explicitly authorizing, the use of military force by those countries to create
safe havens within Iraq to encourage the return of the refugees.
"Consistent (my italics) with United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, and working
closely with the United Nations and other international relief organizations and our European
partners, I have directed the U.S. military to begin immediately to establish several
encampments in northern Iraq where relief supplies for these refugees will be made available
in large quantities and distributed in an orderly way."
A precedent had been set, with a widespread belief that it was backed by some
international authorization, for military intervention in the domestic affairs of a state for
purposes of protecting a minority population from the repression of its own government.
Within several months, two unprecedented initiatives had been taken in the post Cold War
world, one to reinforce the principle of state sovereignty and one which appeared to
undermine that principle. Both were said to be motivated, not for "reasons of state". but
ostensibly in the interests of international peace and security and were perceived to be
actions sanctioned by the Security Council. A new option to the traditional three solutions for
refugees - repatriation, settlement in countries of first asylum and resettlement abroad - had
been created, that is, preventing the refugees from crossing an international border in the first
place by "humanitarian intervention", creating safe havens protected by foreign military
forces within the national homeland of the refugees.
7Note the differences in interpretation. The mass influx is not a result of the war.
They are a product of Iraqui repression, Turkish priorization of realist security steps to
refugee protection and American and British support for that priority combined with
humanitarian concern to create the safe haven regime in Northern Iraq.
The puzzling question is why the author chose to enjoy a very questionable
excursion into two cases of mass refugee flows in a short paper on smuggling. It seems to
be a foil for a form of illegal migration that is not viewed as a threat to a state comparable
to a mass influx. Further, smuggling is analyzed as an effort to get around quotas and
fees. Why fees? Since when were fees the justification for smuggling since immigration
fees, wherever they are imposed, are tiny in comparison to fees paid to smuggler. Further,
the issue is not the quotas but the categories that permit entry which most of those
illegally smuggled would not fall into. Thirdly, in addition to stressing the relative
smallness of the problem, and viewing the effort as an attempt to get around bureaucratic
obstacles (quotas and fees), the author stresses the secrecy of smuggling in contrast to the
openness of mass migration. He also emphasizes the propensity of smuggled humans to
disappear into the woodwork while refugees from mass flows remain a concentrated and
a visible presence.
In other words, relative to any mass influx, smuggled migrants are not a real
security threat. They are not a threat to the American system of government. And there
effect on the economy is debatable. The author does not provide sufficient sources to this
debate re the economic effects on the US, but in California and Texas, these are not small
movements as the author seems ready to concede. Secondly, the debate is a substantive
one, with one side arguing that these illegals depress wages, retard the replacement of
obsolete industries with new ones, etc. On the other side, there is the argument that the
California agricultural economy would collapse without this influx and the overall benefit
is positive or, at the very least neutral. In fact, substantive research has documented the
claim that the overall effect has been negative, and the bias of the author towards the net
positive role from a neo-liberal leaning leads him to ignore the contentions of the
opposite class.
Instead, smuggling is viewed not as a threat to state security or the economy but
to the individual migrants and the integrity of the legal system. The suggestion is made
that the stress on smuggling is based on institutional “rogue” forces (that is, they self-
serving rather than disinterested mandarins) who want to increase their budgets, and the
military looking for a budget to justify the huge budgets already allocated to the
preservation of neo-liberal ideas. Further, smuggling has not undermined the public
confidence in the government. The author does not examine the evidence suggests that
smuggling  does undermine domestic support for immigrants and refugees more
generally. Instead, the concentration of the argument (true to a neo-liberal security
perspective) is to focus on whether the increased input to the military does not
compromise the military’s ability to execute its primary objective – the protection of the
state. Can the use of military means to stop smuggling be constructive (that is, to the neo-
liberal agenda)? [Since my copy was missing page 11, I will simply stop with the
analysis.]
In sum, James Miskel looks at the problem through neo-liberal eyes more than
security eyes and confirms neo-liberal convictions. let us now turn to the regional studies,
8beginning with Emily Copeland who concentrates on the influx from Latin America into
the United States.
Copeland stresses the small proportion of the flow into the US compared to that
going to other states south of the border. {The fact that this may simply be a direct
product of geographical distance from the major source areas is not mentioned. Nor is the
large size of the influx relative to the intake into Canada.) Secondly, stress is made on the
fact that refugee/asylum seekers dominate the inflow rather than migrants, legal or illegal.
In other words, the point of the argument is similar to Miskel’s – to diminish the concern
with the problem rather than to assist in its analysis. It is like saying Tay-Sachs disease
only affects a relatively small number, so we do not have to pay serious attention to the
problem.
Unlike Miskel, Emily attacks the securitization of immigration generally and not
just smuggling. Further, the securitization is not just the employment of military means to
control the border, but the perceived effects on the ability of a sixty year old grandmother
to identify with the population of immigrants with whom she was surrounded, that is, to
feel at home. This explains the public support for these efforts. This support was
reinforced by an increase of questions about and decreasing trust in the ability of the
government to manage the problem, and this undermining the elgitimacy of the
government is cause for real concern. Countering these perceptions are real documented
cases of abuses of the human and civil rights not only of the illegal migrants bot of legal
migrants and even citizens as well. Further, the concern is seen as a byproduct of the drug
trade rather than something important on its own (in spite of the argument that more
money is taken in by the human smugglers than those in the illegal drug trade. Thirdly,
the concern has not led to effective results and, is therefore not only counterproductive
but enhances perceived insecurity and undermines the neo-liberal agenda in the region.
The report moves from what is perceived as a pseudo problem to a real problem –
the movement of refugees from war and environmental damage, particularly. Efforts
placed here help the neo-liberal agenda by advancing regional security and enhancing the
democratic institutional building in the region and the regional cooperation agenda in
general. Further, since illegal immigration is best stopped at the source and by the
country from which the migrants are flowing, and since the alternative policy reinforces
anti-democratic tendencies, including the abuses of human rights, the best policy to
follow is the agenda of neo-liberalism.
Thus, the security paper and the migration paper which overlap, are basically
totally complementary rather than contradictory given the shared neo-liberal outlooks of
the two authors.
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